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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
MANUEL ERNESTO SAMORA, : Case No. 20010988-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Manuel Samora replies to the state's brief as follows. 
Arguments not addressed in this reply brief were either adequately addressed in 
Appellant's opening brief or do not merit reply. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Samora did not invite the trial court's error in imposing a harsher punishment on 
remand. The clear implication of defense counsel's sentencing statements was that the 
fine be reduced as a tradeoff for imposing restitution. 
State v. Babbell. 813 P.2d 86, 88 (Utah 1991) (Babbell ID does not allow 
imposition of a harsher sentence on remand under the circumstances of this case. 
Babbell II involved an illegal sentence which was void whereas this case involves the 
correction of error caused by the imposition of sentence in an illegal manner. Babbell II 
states that "[w]hen a criminal defendant successfully appeals a conviction or sentence, 
§ 76-3-405 prohibits imposition of a new and harsher sentence based on the same 
conduct." Id (emphasis added). While Babbell did not successfully appeal his sentence, 
Samora did successfully appeal the error in imposing sentence and therefore fits squarely 
within the prohibition against harsher sentences on remand of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-405 (1999) and due process. Unlike Babbell II. allowing the imposition of a 
harsher sentence under the circumstances of this case would have a chilling effect on the 
exercise of the right to appeal. 
The increased sentence is also not permissible under the due process and section 
76-3-405 exception which allows for an increase under certain limited circumstances. 
The state misstates this exception when it argues that an increased sentence is permissible 
if the facts were not actually known to a sentencing judge at the time of the original 
sentencing and the record discloses information which supports the increase. In order to 
meet due process requirements, the record must disclose conduct by the defendant after 
the original sentencing which justifies the increase. Unless such conduct is part of the 
record, possible vindictiveness at resentencing and fear of retaliation are injected into the 
decision of a defendant to appeal a sentence which is imposed in an illegal manner. 
In this case, there is no information in the record suggesting any conduct by 
Samora after the original sentencing which would justify an increase. Moreover, even if 
the state's test were considered, the sentencing judge had at least constructive knowledge 
of the restitution information since it was discussed at the plea hearing and was part of 
the record. The sentencing judge's failure to familiarize himself with the record or the 
2 
details of the case, especially where that failure contributed in part to the error in 
sentencing, does not work in favor of finding a lack of knowledge on the part of the 
judge. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT. THE SENTENCING JUDGE ERRED IN IMPOSING A 
HARSHER SENTENCE FOLLOWING REVERSAL ON APPEAL. 
A. SAMORA DID NOT INVITE THIS ERROR. 
Prior to indicating that some restitution was owed in this case, defense counsel 
requested that the sentencing judge waive the fine. R. 122:3-4. The implication of 
defense counsel's statement, when read as a whole, is that counsel asked the judge to 
lower the fine and in lieu of the original fine, impose restitution. R. 122:3-4. Defense 
counsel's statement does not indicate that an increase in the total amount overall is 
permissible. Instead, the statement merely suggests a tradeoff between the originally 
imposed fine and restitution. 
B. IMPOSITION OF HARSHER PUNISHMENT IS NOT 
PERMISSIBLE IN THIS CASE. 
Relying on Babbell II, the state argues that the illegal sentence was void and 
subsequent imposition of a more severe sentence is therefore permissible. 813 P.2d at 
88. Contrary to the state's argument, however, a more severe sentence is not permissible 
in this case where Samora's original sentence was overturned on appeal because it was 
imposed in an illegal manner. 
3 
In State v. BabbelL 770 P.2d 987, 994 (Utah 1989) (Babbell I \ the Court vacated 
the sentences and remanded for resentencing because the trial court had imposed illegal 
sentences. Although the convictions required minimum mandatory prison sentences, the 
trial court had imposed sentences of five to life without imposing the minimum 
mandatory sentence. After the state pointed out during oral argument that the sentences 
which had been imposed by the trial court were not authorized by statute, the Supreme 
Court vacated the illegal sentences. On remand, the trial court imposed the statutorily 
authorized minimum mandatory sentences. 
In Babbell II, the Court recognized that section 76-3-405 "was intended to protect 
the right of a criminal defendant to appeal, not to prevent the correction of a sentence 
unlawfully imposed.1' 813 P.2d at 87. It also recognized that f'[w]hen a criminal 
defendant successfully appeals a conviction or sentence, § 76-3-405 prohibits imposition 
of a new and harsher sentence based on the same conduct." Id. (emphasis added). 
Prohibiting the imposition of a harsher sentence after a defendant successfully appeals 
the sentence "is appropriate because federal '[d]ue process of law . . . requires that 
vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction 
must play no part in the sentence he receives after a new [sentencing].5" Id., quoting 
North Carolina v. Pearce. 395 U.S. 711, 725, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2080, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 
(1969). 
The Court further explained that federal due process and the importance of the 
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state constitutional right of criminal defendants to appeal require that a harsher sentence 
not be imposed following a reversal on appeal. 
In State v. Sorensen, 639 P.2d 179, 181 (Utah 1981), this Court held 
that federal due process prohibits a harsher sentence from being imposed in 
a second trial for the same offense after a reversal of the first conviction. 
That constitutional policy is particularly compelling in this state because 
there are two explicit state constitutional rights of a criminal defendant to 
appeal, Article I, section 12 of the Declaration of Rights in the Utah 
Constitution and Article VIII, section 5. A defendant's constitutional right 
to appeal is further protected by § 76-3-405. The purpose behind these 
provisions is to prevent the chilling effect on the constitutional right which 
the possibility of a harsher sentence would have on a defendant who might 
be able to demonstrate reversible error in his conviction. This Court has 
stated: 
The purpose of an appeal is to promote justice by ferreting 
out erroneous judgments. That purpose is not promoted by 
imposing on a defendant who demonstrates the error of his 
conviction the risk that he may be penalized with a harsher sentence 
for having done so. An erroneous judgment of conviction is as 
much an affront to society's interest in the fair administration of 
justice as it is to an individual's rights. 
Chess v. Smith, 617 P.2d 341, 343 (Utah 1980). 
Id at 88. 
Although imposition of a harsher sentence after a defendant successfully appeals 
his sentence violates due process and section 76-3-405, it did not violate due process or 
the statute in Babbell II because the defendant had not successfully appealed his 
sentence. Id Instead, the Court recognized while the case was on appeal that an illegal 
sentence which was more lenient than that which was authorized by statute had been 
imposed, and vacated that il1 ^gal sentence. The Court reasoned that section 76-3-405 
and due process were not violated under the circumstances of Babbell II because it is 
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unlikely that vacating an illegal sentence will have a chilling effect on the right to appeal 
and the illegal sentence is void and can be corrected at any time. Id. 
Nevertheless, the principles underlying Sorensen, Chess, Pearce, 
and § 76-3-405 have no application in this case. The correction of an 
illegal sentence stands on a different footing from the correction of an error 
of conviction. First, a defendant is not likely to appeal a sentence that is 
unlawfully lenient, and there is, therefore, minimal chilling effect on the 
right to appeal. 
Second, § 77-35-22(e) specifically provides that because an illegal 
sentence is void, a trial court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. 
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While correction of an illegal sentence stands on a different footing than 
correction of an error of conviction, correction of a sentence imposed in an illegal 
manner does not. Imposing a harsher but statutorily correct sentence after an illegal 
sentence is vacated does not have a chilling effect on the right to appeal, whereas 
allowing imposition of a harsher sentence after the defendant has successfully appealed a 
sentence which was imposed in an illegal manner does have such an effect. If the trial 
court were permitted to impose a harsher sentence after a defendant demonstrated on 
appeal that the manner in which the sentence was imposed violated statutory and 
constitutional protections, defendants like Samora who are sentenced in an unlawful 
manner would not appeal their convictions for fear the trial judge would impose an even 
harsher sentence following a successful appeal. The appellate purpose of ferreting out 
erroneous judgments in which sentences were imposed in an illegal manner would not be 
furthered by allowing trial courts to impose harsher sentences after the original sentence 
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is vacated on appeal because it was imposed in an illegal manner. Since there is a 
chilling effect on the rights of criminal defendants to appeal sentences imposed in an 
illegal manner if the trial court is allowed to impose a harsher sentence after the 
defendant demonstrates on appeal that the manner in which the sentence was imposed 
violated statutory and constitutional protections, due process and section 76-3-405 
prohibit the imposition of a harsher sentence after a defendant successfully appeals. 
See Id. 
In this case, Samora successfully appealed his sentence, claiming that it was 
imposed in violation of due process and Utah R. Crim. 22(a). State v. Samora. 2001 UT 
App 266 (unpublished). To allow the trial court to impose a harsher sentence after 
Samora successfully appealed his sentence would allow the type of vindictiveness and 
fear of retaliation which was at the root of the Court's concern in Pearce . See Pearce, 
395 U.S. at 725. It would discourage defendants from appealing sentences which are 
imposed in an illegal manner, undermine justice by allowing sentences which are 
imposed in an illegal manner to be carried out without challenge, and serve as "'an 
affront to society's interest in the fair administration of justice'" as well as Samora's 
rights. Babbell IL 813 P.2d at 88, quoting Chess, 617 P.2d at 343. Babbell II does not 
allow for the imposition of a harsher sentence after a defendant successfully appeals the 
manner in which the sentence was imposed, and due process and section 76-3-405 
mandate that a harsher sentence not be imposed under such circumstances. 
7 
The state argues alternatively that even if the trial court was "subject to the 'no 
harsher sentence' rule," imposition of a harsher sentence was permissible in this case 
because the increased sentence was based on facts not known to the trial court at the time 
of the original sentence and the record discloses the basis for the increased sentence. 
State's brief at 10-12. According to the state, the exception section 76-3-405(2)(a) was 
met because when the judge originally imposed sentence in violation of due process and 
Rule 22(a), he did not know that restitution was at issue, and at the resentencing, he 
solicited testimony as to the amount due. 
Contrary to the state's argument, the circumstances of this case do not fit the 
exception set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405 or required by due process. Moreover, 
there would be a tremendous chilling effect if judges could impose a harsher sentence at 
resentencing under the circumstances of this case. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-405(2)(a) states that the statutory rule against harsher 
sentences does not apply when "the increased sentence is based on facts which were not 
known to the court at the time of the original sentence, and the court affirmatively places 
on the record the facts which provide the basis for the increased sentence . . . . " Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-3-405(2)(a). This exception must be interpreted to comply with the due 
process requirement that an increased punishment cannot be imposed on remand unless 
the record affirmatively indicates that the increased sentence was based on conduct by 
the defendant after the original sentencing which justifies such an increase. Pearce , 395 
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U.S. at 726. 
In this case, there was no conduct by Samora after the original sentencing and no 
other change in circumstances which would justify imposition of a harsher sentence on 
remand. Imposition of a harsher sentence cannot therefore be upheld. 
In addition, any information regarding restitution was known prior to the original 
sentencing and was part of the record. At the very least, the sentencing judge should 
have known at the original sentencing that imposition of restitution was a possibility not 
only because restitution is always a consideration at a criminal sentencing, but also 
because of the nature of the conviction. Had the judge paid any attention to the details of 
the case at the original sentencing, he would have considered whether restitution should 
be imposed. Moreover, the judge had constructive if not actual knowledge of the 
possibility that restitution could be imposed in this case because the record discloses that 
restitution was discussed at the plea hearing. R. 63:3. The judge's failure to familiarize 
himself with the details of the case, particularly where those details are a matter of 
record, does not satisfy the requirement that the information was not known to the court. 
In this case where the possibility that restitution would be imposed was evident at the 
original sentencing and the record established the details of the restitution, the facts 
regarding restitution were known to the court at the time of the original sentencing. The 
facts of this case therefore do not fit the lack of knowledge requirement of the exception 
found in section 76-3-405(2)(a). 
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This case also does not fit the second requirement for the exception found in 
subsection 2(a) because the sentencing court did not affirmatively place on the record 
facts which would justify an increased sentence. This second requirement for application 
of the exception mandates that the judge detail any conduct by the defendant or any 
change in circumstances or other justification for imposing an increased sentence. In this 
case, the record does not disclose any basis for imposing an increased sentence. Instead, 
the record merely indicates the amount of restitution requested by the state and lays out 
why restitution would have been appropriate at the original sentencing. Because the 
record does not contain any information which would justify an increase at resentencing, 
the harsher sentence violated due process and section 76-3-405. 
Allowing an increase in punishment under the circumstances of this case would 
allow judges to act vindictively after a sentence is vacated on appeal by imposing a 
harsher sentence then articulating facts which were available but not discussed at the 
original sentencing. Additionally, allowing an increase under these circumstances would 
create a fear of retaliatory motivation which would have a chilling effect on the exercise 
of the right to appeal. Unless an increase is clearly based on conduct by the defendant 
after the original sentencing, sentencing judges will be free to scour the case for negative 
information in an effort to justify an increased sentence, and defendants might refrain 
from appealing an error because of a fear that a harsher sentence will be imposed if they 
prevail. Since due process mandates that neither vindictiveness nor the fear of retaliatory 
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motive can play any part in resentencing, Pearce and its due process underpinnings 
require that the increase in this case not be upheld where it is based on information which 
was known and part of the record at the original sentencing. See Pearce. 395 U.S. at 
725-26. 
Finally, without any citation to case law or analysis of any type, the state claims 
the increase did not violate due process. State's brief at 12. The state's entire discussion 
regarding the exception to the due process prohibition against increased punishment is as 
follows: 
Further, because the increased sentence was based on facts that were 
not known at the time of the original sentence, the increase had a 
permissible, non-retaliatory basis. The increase therefore did not violate 
due process. 
State's brief at 12. The state's claim that the increased punishment qualified for an 
exception to the due process requirement that a sentence not be increased after it is 
vacated on appeal is not adequately briefed and should therefore be rejected. See Utah 
R. App. P. 24; State v. Montova. 937 P.2d 145 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Moreover, the 
state ignores the clear requirement of Pearce that in order to comply with due process, the 
record must disclose conduct by the defendant after the original sentencing which 
justifies the increased punishment. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725. 
When a judge imposes a harsher sentence following reversal on appeal, due 
process is violated unless there is "objective information concerning identifiable conduct 
on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing 
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proceeding." IcL at 726 (emphasis added). The factual details of the conduct by 
defendant which occurred after the original sentencing must be part of the record "so that 
the constitutional legitimacy of the increased sentence may be fully reviewed on appeal." 
Id. In this case, there is nothing on the record indicating conduct by Samora after the 
original sentencing which would justify an increased sentence. The state's reliance on 
information regarding restitution which occurred prior to the original sentencing, was 
known at the time of the original sentencing, and was a matter of record does not meet 
the constitutional requirements set forth in Pearce. The imposition of a harsher sentence 
on remand where the record does not disclose conduct by Samora after the original 
sentencing which would justify such an increase violates due process. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Manuel Samora respectfully requests that this Court vacate 
the illegally imposed restitution order. 
SUBMITTED this jx* day of August, 2002. 
( jk^Q}> LJCBLZS 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
JOHN K. WEST 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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